Rethinking Labor History: Toward a Post-Materialist Rhetoric by Sewell, William H. Jr.
TRANSFORMATIONS W comparative study of social transformations 
CSST 
WORKING PAPERS 
The University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor 
RETHINKING LABOR HISTORY: TOWARD A 
POST-MATERALIST RHETORIC 
. . . . 






RETHINKING LABOR HISTORY: 
TOWARD A POST-MATERIALIST RHETORIC 
William H. Sewell, Jr. 
University of Michigan 
May, 1990 
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TOWARD A POST-MATERIALIST RHETORIC 
Is There Anything Wrong With Labor History? 
Labor history is not in crisis. Good work is being done in large 
quantity, not only by historians, but by sociologists, economists, and 
political scientists as well. Such specialized journals as TnternationaI 
Labor and Workins Class Histortand Labor Historv are thriving, and articles 
on labor history are featured prominently in major journals of the various 
fields. Yet it is hard to argue that labor history is a major site of 
historiographical innovation, as it unquestionably was in the 1960s or the 
1970s. Here I think it is useful to compare labor history to women's history. 
Although both fields began their rapid expansion in the same historiographical 
and political era -- labor history in the later 1960s and the 1970s with 
women's history perhaps a half decade behind -- women's history has retained 
an intellectual vitality that labor history has lost. 
I can see two reasons for this difference. The most important, I 
suspect, is that the political project of the women's movement, for all its 
setbacks and hesitations during the last decade,.remains far more lively, 
self-confident, and aggressive than the contemporary labor movement. As the 
organized working class seems less and less likely to perform the liberating 
role assigned to it in both revolutionary and reformist discourses about 
labor, the study of the history of the working class has lost some of its 
urgency. But there is also a difference of a more strictly intellectual kind. 
Women's history, and feminist studies more generally, have been a major site 
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of theoretical struggles in the human sciences. Advocates of cultural, neo- 
Freudian, deconstructionist, and materialist approaches are locked in intense 
and so far inconclusive battle in feminist studies. In labor studies, by 
comparison, a broadly materialist perspective continues to dominate the field. 
There have been some challenges -- for example Gareth ~tedman-~ones'(l983) and 
Joan Scott's (1988) mutually hostile arguments for the primacy of language 
over class in the determination of labor politics -- but Stedman-Jones and 
Scott have so far recruited few fOllOWerS among labor historians, who have 
tended to dismiss them for lapsing into "mere" intellectual history. I 
believe that labor history is destined to suffer from continuing intellectual 
doldrums unless its largely unexamined materialist common sense is more widely 
and vigorously contested. This paper is intended as a contribution to that 
contestation. 
Since I see labor history's problem as theoretical, this paper will 
operate at a strictly theoretical level. I will in fact have very little to 
say about recent or not-so-recent contributions to labor history or about 
significant empirical problems that I think need more work. Instead, , I will 
be examining and criticizing certain fundamental theoretical constructs that 
many labor historians -- along with other social scientists -- use in their 
studies. 
What we usually call theory may be thought of as containing two 
complementary but distinguishable dimensions: the logical and the rhetorical. 
The logical task of theory is to elaborate and specify logical relations 
between theoretical propositions. The rhetorical task, on which I will 
concentrate in this paper, is the provision of figurative and linguistic 
frameworks or paradigms by means of which we select research problems and 
evaluate the relevance, appropriateness, or completeness of researchers' 
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truth-claims (see Nelson, et. al, 1987). I would argue that most labor 
historians have based their judgements on an implicit or explicit reductive 
materialist rhetorical paradigm. What this means in practice is that those 
features of the historical situation regarded as "material" are assumed to 
have greater causal power than features regarded as cultural or political or 
ideological. In my experience, labor historians are too easily satisfied by 
explanations that identify a "material" cause -- say declining control over 
the process of production -- but are highly skeptical about explanations that 
identify cultural causes -- say shifts in political or religious discourse -- 
no matter how well documented or tightly argued the cultural explanation may 
be. 'The normal response of labor historians to cultural explanations is to 
argue that the supposed cultural cause is either less important than some 
alternative "material" cause or that the proposed cultural cause is itself the 
effect of "deeper-lying" material factors. In this way the rhetorical common 
sense of labor history privileges "material" over cultural or political or 
ideological phenomena. 
The extraordinary role played by the concept of proletarianization in 
recent labor history is a perfect example of the operation of this materialist 
common sense. Proletarianization, a preeminently "material" phenomenon, has 
tended to become the omnibus all-purpose causal force in labor history. The 
term "proletarianization" actually combines under a single aegis a large 
number of empirically distinct processes that have occurred in Europe and 
North America since the late eighteenth century: the movement of populations 
from agriculture to industry, the separation of producers from ownership of 
the means of production, a decline of producers' control over the process of 
production, and the making obsolete of producers' skills. It is demonstrably 
the case that at least the first three of these processes underwent a global 
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progression over the course of the nineteenth century. ÿÿ he third, 
deskilling, had a more ambiguous history, since both deskilling and Eskilling 
go on constantly and simultaneously in any society undergoing technological 
change. In my experience, labor historians have typically emphasized the 
deskilling and ignored the reskilling.) The problem, as I see it, is that 
labor historians have tended to combine all these diverse processes under a 
single covering term, tending to see any example of, say, declining control of 
production or deskilling as a manifestation of the underlying master process 
of "proletarianization." Thus, a few well-documented examples of deskilling 
or declining control in a trade or a class are taken as evidence that the 
trade or the class as a whole is experiencing the underlying process, and 
consequently that workers' actions, such as strikes, insurrections, or 
political movements, can be explained as responses to "proletarianization." 
Labor historians' materialist predilections, I would argue, have made them 
willing to accept "proletarianization" as a sort of universally valid 
"material" explanation, and has consequently blunted their analyses of the 
role of both discourse and politics in labor history. 
But my goal in this talk is not to criticize the concept of 
"proletarianization," so much as to contest the materialist rhetorical common 
sense on which it depends. I shall try to do so in two steps. First I shall 
attempt an historical deconstruction of the idea that the economy is 
"material." My object will be to demonstrate not only that the equation of 
the economy with the material is arbitrary and misleading, but that the 
genealogy of this idea is suspicious as well. Second, I shall attempt to 
provide a more appropriate figuration of the object of labor history, and of 
social history in general, than that offered by the reductive materialist 
model. I shall do so by pushing to their logical conclusions tendencies 
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already present in contemporary labor studies -- and in the contemporary human 
sciences more generally. I should warn you that what I offer here is not a 
fully developed and sequentially laid-out logical argument. It might be more 
accurate to characterize it as a series of unequal and nonparallel skits 
linked by Monty-Pythonesque transitions. 
First Skit: A Historical Deconstruction of the "Materiality" of the Economy 
The founding metaphor of the materialist paradigm is the notion that 
"the economy" is "material." But on close examination, the idea that economic 
life is particularly or uniformly "material" is quite arbitrary. Much of what 
goes.on in the sphere of production and exchange looks awfully "ideal" or 
"cultural" or "symbolic" to me. Let me offer a few examples. 
1) Let's start from the top with monev. In ordinary speech the 
"material" is more or less equated with "money-making." Yet money is nothing 
if not a symbol system -- and a very complicated symbol system at that. Money 
is not useful in itself, but is only a conventional sign of value that is used 
to trade for commodities. As labor specialists from Karl Marx to William 
Reddy have argued, the fact that exchange relations are mediated by money 
commonly deludes people into thinklng that such relations are'"freet' rather 
than coerced ex eddy, 1987). Like any symbol, in other words, money is defined 
by its relation to other symbols and has the power to fix the meanings, to 
shape the possible interpretations, of human action. Money, a symbol if ever 
there was one, stands at the center of and designates the very boundaries of 
that sphere of life that we designate as material in capitalist society. 
2) A second aspect of economic activity that is hard to characterize as 
"material" is, of course, advertizigq. Since the late nineteenth century, a 
higher and higher proportion of the .work and investment of capitalist firms 
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has gone into advertizing, that is, into symbolic representations of 
commodities to potential consumers. Advertizing is the production of 
pictorial, musical, and verbal images for billboards, magazines, radio, 
television, and other media. These images are designed to incite potential 
consumers to desire specific symbolically marked commodities -- to desire not , 
bread or fountain pens, but Wonder Bread and Parker Pens. Moreover, the 
symbolic definition of commodities is not restricted to their packaging or 
their mediated imaging; it is also embodied in their production. Industrial 
designers must make sure that a Mont BlanC fountain pen is distinguishable in 
its actual material form from a Parker fountain pen, or a Braun electric 
coffee pot from a Mister Coffee. Armies of designers and advertizers, 
employed both by major corporations and by specialized agencies, engage in the 
sculpting of metal and plastic, the composition of tunes, the crafting of 
evocative word sequences or photographic images. The actual work they do is 
not distinguishable in kind from the lofty creative activities of artists. 
But their activities are "economict' and are therefore assigned to the material 
sphere, while the empirically indistinguishable activities of painters, 
sculptors, musicians, or poets are not. 
3) It might be objected that the seemingly "immaterial" aspects of 
economic life discussed thus far -- money and advertizing -- concern only the 
circulation or exchange of commodities, and not their production. But in 
fact, the "ideal" or the "symbolic" also intrudes into production itself. The 
complex of machines that makes up an assembly line is not just a series of 
material objects, but the result an elaborately thought-out design -- one that 
is developed on sketch-pads and blue prints, or nowadays on computers, long 
before it assumes a material form in the factory. And much production work is 
only ambiguously material: in contemporary production, workers may not 
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actually manipulate the goods they are manufacturing, but rather program 
computerized tools and monitor their performance by means of computer 
generated signals. And the productivity of machines is not simply a function 
of their design and scientific efficiency; it also depends fundamentally on 
the knowledge and the morale of the labor force. Quality circles, in which 
workers develop means of improving the quality or efficiency of production 
through intensive discursive interchange, may have contributed more to the 
superiority of Japanese consumer goods than any advantage in purely mechanical 
technique. Nor is the intrusion of the "ideal" into production a peculiarity 
of very recent and highly technologized means of producing goods. Before the 
introduction of assembly lines, as David Montgomery (a materialist if ever 
there was one) reminds us, "the boss's~brains were under the cap of the 
worker;" it was the workers' skill and organizational know-how that made 
possible the sustained and effective production of quality goods (~ontgomery, 
1979). Or to step back even farther, guild apprentices were to be taught "the 
mysteries of the trade," the secret skills and formulae and the finesse and 
taste that would assure their ability to maintain the guild's reputation for 
quality and style. Aesthetic, symbolic, and organizational knowledge -- all 
of which could as easily be classified "ideal" as "material" -- have always 
been part and parcel of the production process. 
In short, when economic life is looked at closely, there turns out to be 
a lot that is immaterial about production and exchange. Like activities that 
go on in other spheres -- say government, learning, religion, or warfare -- 
production and exchange entails a complex mixture of what we would usually 
call the ideal and the material. The closer we look, the clearer it becomes 
that labeling economic activities as "material" and distinguishing them from 
"non-material" spheres is utterly arbitrary. 
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Where, then, did the bizarre notion that production and exchange were 
uniquely paterial come from? The answer, I think, is highly paradoxical. It 
actually derives from traditional European Christian and aristocratic 
metaphysics, which were subsequently stood on their head by the Enlightenment. 
The notion of a distinct material realm comes ultimately from the 
Christian division of the cosmos into two radically different substances: 
spirit, which was lofty, orderly, and powerful, and matter, which was base, 
disorderly, and inert. The hierarchy of spirit and matter was also used 
metaphorically to make distinctions between different categories or orders of 
human beings. Although all pre-modern European countries had analogous 
distinctions, we might as well take the well-known case of old-regime France, 
where the population was divided into three estates. The clergy were of 
course the First Estate because their activities -- spiritual affairs -- were 
the loftiest. The the nobles were the Second Estate because they 
magnanimously sacrificed their lives in defense of the realm. The Third 
Estate, by contrast, was vile and ignoble, soiled by its labor and its base 
pursuit of worldly material goods. So the clichls went. But on close 
inspection, it is hard to see how the actual activities of commoners were more 
material, than those of nobles. The nobles normally spent their time either 
making war or practicing for it -- riding horses, handling weapons, and 
developing their physical prowess through bodily exercise. Peasants' 
activities were actually quite analogous -- leading teams of oxen, handling 
plows, axes, and pitchforks, and exhausting themselves with physical labor. 
Rather than the producers of goods being classified as base because their 
activity was uniquely material, production of goods was classified as material 
because those who produced them were regarded as base. The characterization 
of production and exchange as material, was thus logically arbitrary. It had 
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nothing to do with the factual extent to which the different orders or 
estates' activities were material. Rather, the designation of production and 
exchange as material was a metapnor; it resulted from an effort to align the 
hierarchies of social status in Medieval and Early Modern Europe with 
contemporary cosmological theories. 
The Enlightenment challenged both the cosmology and the assumptions 
about social status. The Enlightenment was inspired, of course, by the 
astonishing advances made in natural philosophy in the seventeenth century. 
The discoveries of Newton and others had demonstrated that the world of 
matter, far from being gross and disorderly, was ordered by sublime and 
invariant natural laws. And simultaneously, the realm of spirit, at least as 
manifested in the various versions of the Christian religion, had proved in 
the seventeenth century to be an endless source of tumult, warfare, slaughter, 
and discord. Enlightenment thinkers therefore eschewed theological 
disputation and attempted to apply the methods of science -- or more exactly, 
its rhetoric -- to the study of human society. 
The philosophy of the Enlightenment was, broadly speaking, materialist. 
This materialism was manifested, for example, in Montesquieu's climatic 
determinism or in Lockean epistemology, which held that the mind was furnished 
with ideas by sense impressions taken directly from the material world. In 
this intellectual climate, the conventional metaphorical operation that coded 
production and exchange as material represented an inviting opportunity, one 
that was seized by the economic thinkers of the Enlightenment, both the French 
Physiocrats and the Scottish moralists. If production and exchange were 
materiak, they should be governed by invariant laws analogous to those that 
governed physical matter. Over the course of the eighteenth century the 
economists duly discovered such laws. It is highly significant that the first 
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coherent school of economic thinkers actually dubbed themselves the 
"Physiocrats. " The title "physiocracy ," which of course means "the rule of 
the physical,'' makes clear the overall thrust of the economists' project: to 
find the essential ordering principles of human life in the "material" sphere 
of production and exchange, the very sphere that had for so long been 
disdained by philosophers, theologians, and rulers as vile and lowly. The 
fact that the activities they saw as determining the wealth, power, and 
happiness of nations could be characterized as material or physical, and 
therefore as analogous to the physical nature studied by the natural 
philosophers, subtly but powerfully fortified their claim to have discovered a 
genuine science of human government. The early economists, in other words, 
took over intact the traditional equation of production and exchange with the 
material, but they inverted the traditional valuation of the material, which 
for them implied order and reason rather than vileness and turpitude. 
Both the materialist bias of the Enlightenment and the conventional 
coding of production and exchange as material were carried over into the 
nineteenth century by the political economists, whence they were appropriated 
by Marx in his famous attempt to turn Hegel's idealism on its head. From Marx 
, they have saturated the discourse of the left and have become the unquestioned 
conventions of labor history. But notice the irony: Marxists proudly proclaim 
their radicalism by employing an arbitrary identification of the economic as 
material, never realizing that they have inherited this idea intact and 
uncriticized from traditional Christian and aristocratic discourse. Hence 
would-be friends of the proletariat believe they are being progressive when 
they denounce as "idealists" historians who actually take seriously what past 
proletarians thought. The claim that the economy is uniquely "material" 
always was arbitrary, misleading, and tendentious; that it continues to be 
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clung to by purportedly leftist scholars is an. embarrassing anachronism. In 
my opinion it is time to abandon the notion that the economy is "material" 
altogether and to jetison the entire panoply of historical and social- 
scientific rhetoric it supports. 
And now for something completely different.... 
Second Skit: Reflections on Oxymoronic Book Titles 
I have been struck by the proliferation of oxymorons in the titles of 
recent books in labor studies. Let me offer five examples: banufacturinq 
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Consent (1979) and The Politics of Production, (1985), both by the Berkeley 
sociologist Michael Burawoy, The Manased Heart (1983) by his colleague Arlie 
Hochschild, The Rise of Market Culture (1984) by William Reddy, and 'BE 
Lansuase of Labor (sewell, 1980) by yours truly. I shall argue that these 
oxymoronic titles, properly understood, point toward a new rhetorical paradigm 
for labor history. 
What makes these titles oxymoronic? Oxymorons are figures of speech 
whose evocative power arises from their uniting of opposites, as in "murky 
brilliance," "gentle terrors," "deep play," or the unintentional classic 
"military intelligence." The labor studies titles cited above are all 
oxymoronic because they unite realms that are conventionally regarded as not 
only distinct, but oDDosin9 -- the realms of politics, the economy, and 
culture. "Language of labor," "market culture," "managed heart" and 
"manufacturing consent" all unite the realm of culture (language, culture, 
heart, consent) with realm of the economy (labor, market, managed, 
manufacturing); similarly, "politics of production" unites the realms of 
economy and politics. The titles are all tantalizing, and they tantalize 
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because they suggest that the supposedly distinct sphere of production and 
exchange is in fact interlaced with culture and politics. 
The books in fact deliver more or less what they promise. All of them 
challenge, explicitly or implicitly, the notion that production and exchange 
constitute a distinct sphere of "material" relations. They snow how labor 
movements arise from semantic transformations, how market culture predates the 
formation of market institutions, how emotion can be managed in order to 
create profits, how ideological consent is as important a product of factories 
as physical goods, and how relations of production arise less out of 
technology than out of "factory regimes." All the books demonstrate that 
relations of production are not only affected, but actually ~anstitutea, by 
politics and/or culture. And they do this by applying to the supposedly 
"material" realm theoretical approaches and methods originally developed to 
study other realms -- think, for example, of Burawoy's formal typology of what 
he calls "factory regimes" or of Reddy's and Sewell's semantic histories of 
such crucial terms as "srl ve" and "cor~oratioq. "
The oxymoronic titles, then, point toward a rhetorical paradigm for 
labor history quite different from the standard reductive materialism. They 
refuse, by implication, to recognize a distinct "material" realm and they 
insist that production and exchange be understood as no less susceptible to 
shaping by politics and culture than are the art world, religion, or the 
state. And they sustain powerful and empirically rich nonreductive accounts 
of the political and cultural constitution of labor relations. I think these 
books are valuable examples and are on the right rhetorical track; however, 
none of them attempts to spell out explicitly an appropriate paradigm to 
replace the materialist reductionism that both their titles and their 
arguments have effectively dissolved. The message of the oxymoronic titles is 
there for all to read, but it clearly needs both exegesis and publicity. 
And now for something completely different.... 
Third Skit: Blurred Genres, Interdisciplinarity, and Imperialist Claims in the 
Human Sciences 
Clifford Geertz observed a decade ago that the genres of the human 
sciences have become increasingly "blurred." Although his observations came 
principally from a particular territory -- the ambiguous borderlands between 
the social sciences and the humanities -- I think the condition he describes 
is quite general and has become more general over the ensuing decade. The 
pervasive use of oxymoronic titles, both inside and outside of labor studies, 
is in fact one marker of the blurring of genres. (It might be pointed out in 
passing that Geertz is something of a virtuoso in the oxymoronic genre, having 
contributed "thick description," "deep play," and "the theater state.") 
(~eertz, 1973a, 1980, 1983) One sign of generalized genre blurring is a 
growing rage for interdisciplinarity. The proliferation of interdisciplinary 
scholarly journals, which has been going on for some time now, shows no signs 
of slackening. It is probably now the case that more genuinely path-breaking 
articles are published in such journals as Comparative Studies in Societv and 
History, C-, Sisns, Politics and Societv, or Pepresentations 
than in the leading disciplinary journals -- for example, Modern Lansuase 
Notes, The Journal of Political Economv, or The Journal of Modern Historv, A 
particularly striking contemporary development is the proliferation of 
interdisciplinary programs and research centers in major universities -- for 
example, the Committee on Historical Studies at the New School for Social 
Research, the Program on Rhetoric of Inquiry at the University of Iowa, the 
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History and Society Program at the University of Minnesota, the Committee on 
Critical Practice at the University of Chicago, the Center for Social Theory 
and Comparative History at UCLA , and the Program on the Comparative Study of 
Social Transformations at the University of Michigan. 
Although disciplines continue to control graduate training, hiring, and 
promotions, they have effectively ceased to control the intellectual life of 
the human sciences in major American universities. The intellectual map is no 
longer characterized by distinct disciplinary territories with heavily 
fortified boundaries, but by amorphous disciplines with porous and distended 
boundaries that are criss-crossed by overlapping, often tentatively defined, 
interdisciplinary projects. I welcome this ill-defined landscape because it 
makes possible much greater intellectual variety than in the old discipline- 
dominated landscape. Yet it could also be argued that the very indefiniteness 
of intellectual boundaries also endangers variety by making possible the 
formulation of grand imperial schemes -- ambitious attempts to sweep across 
the whole of the human sciences and impose a new and uniform order on all 
branches of knowledge. 
The classical map of the human sciences regarded culture, the economy, 
and politics as distinct institutional spheres, each of which was governed by 
principles elaborated in a distinct analytical vocabulary and assigned to a 
distinct discipline: the economy to economics departments, politics to 
political science, and culture to anthropology and literature. But the 
interdisciplinary explosion of recent years has liberated the analytical 
vocabularies from their disciplinary enclosures and from their exclusive 
concern with any narrowly defined institutional sphere. In the open and 
amorphous landscape of the contemporary human sciences, cultural theories, 
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economic theories, and political theories have all claimed the capacity to 
encompass by themselves the full range of social relations. 
Theories claiming that all social relations are cultural or discursive 
are perhaps the most common, and often argue in a deconstructionist mode. 
Prominent examples would be Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's Hesemonv and, 
Socialist Stratesv (1985)~ or, to return to the territory of labor history, 
Joan Scott's Gender and the Politics of Historv (1988). The claim that all 
social relations are economic, or, more precisely, are determined by choice 
under conditions of scarcity, is characteristic of works in the rational 
choice mode, by, for example, Gary Becker (198 1) , Michael Hechter (1987) , or 
James Coleman (1989). The claim that all social relations are fundamentally 
political is perhaps best represented by the later works of Michel Foucault, 
especially PisciPline and Punish (1977) and The Historv of Sexualitv (1978). 
My own position on these claims is paradoxical. I would argue that U of 
these imperialist claims are right, and therefore that they are also all 
wrong. Let me explain what I mean by taking up the claims in turn. 
(1) All of social life is cultural or discursive. In other words, every 
aspect of every institutional sphere of human life is determined by questions 
of neanins. Cultural anthropologists have shown that all of our activities, 
from the most elaborate to the simplest, from the most abstract learned 
disquisitions to the most concrete bodily functions, are shaped by linguistic 
and para-linguistic processes of meaning formation, by symbols and their 
manipulation -- by discourse, in the very broad sense in which this term is 
used by Scott (1988) or Laclau and Mouffe (1985). This means that there is no 
sphere of human life that cannot be analyzed profitably by means of literary, 
semiotic, or rhetorical techniques to discover and interrelate the meanings 
that it instantiates and displays. 
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(2) 811 of social life is economic. In other words, every aspect of 
every sphere of human life is determined by questions of choice under 
scarcity. Not only contemporary "rational action" theorists, but philosophers 
and economists as far back as Jeremy Bentham, have insisted that choices among 
alternative means to attain scarce ends beset not only workers or 
entrepreneurs concerned with how best to produce goods, or merchants concerned 
with what to sell and what to buy, but all sorts of of people faced with all 
sorts of decisions, from major policy issues to the conduct of daily life. 
For example Gary Becker's "new home economics" shows that decisions to have a 
baby or to get married can plausibly be treated as instances of investment, 
consumption, or the formation of commercial Contracts (1981). Most labor 
historians would belittle Becker's claims, in part because he is a 
conservative neo-classical economist of the Chicago school. But in practice 
we ourselves commonly, and quite properly, treat workers' decisions as results 
of calculations about advantage, personal or collective. In truth, there is 
nothing humans do that is not shaped by ends-means considerations under 
conditions of scarcity. Rational actor theorists are attempting to clarify 
and systematize these considerations, and to extend them formally to 
situations outside the sphere of production and exchange. 
(3) B11 of social life is Political. In other words, every aspect of 
every sphere of human life involves questions of power or domination. The 
sinews of power relations, backed up by coercion and sometimes by the threat 
of violence, extend everywhere -- they are "capillary," in Foucault's 
metaphor. This is true even -- perhaps especially, as Foucault's later work 
implies (~oucault, 1977, 1978) -- of the seemingly anonymous pursuit of 
scientific knowledge, which both produces the authority of those who know and 
is based on the authority that empowers them to observe, experiment, and 
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pronounce truth or falsity. And it is certainly true, as Michael Burawoy's 
studies demonstrate, of labor at the point of production (1985). Everything 
we do produces, reproduces, challenges, or is limited by relations of power 
among persons and groups. 
I would argue that we must accept all of these imperialist claims -- 
cultural, economic, and political. But from this it also follows that the 
imperialism of each claim systematically undermines the imperialism of the 
others. Each imperialist theory is right to insist that the analytical 
vocabulary originally developed for its "home" institutional sphere can in 
fact be extended to any and all of society's institutional spheres. But 
nowhere, even in the "home" institutional sphere, can u of the theories 
claim a monopoly of explanatory power. In short, I don't think we can accept 
the classical disciplinary map of the social world as constituted by more or 
less autonomous spheres of politics, culture, and economics. Nor do I think 
we can accept the "imperialist" picture of the social world as constituted by 
a range of diverse institutions and practices all of which can be explained 
sufficiently either by meaning, or by power, or by scarcity. Instead, I would 
argue that we must imagine a world in which every social relationship is 
gimultaneouslv and irreduciblv constituted by meaning, by scarcity, and by 
power. This would imply, for example, that all social relations are 
discursive, but that that social relations are never exhausted by their 
discursivity. Indeed, it implies something much more radical: that the 
discursive features of the social relationship are themselves always 
constitutively shaped by power relations and by conditions of choice under 
scarcity. It further implies that this constitutive shaping is entirely 
reciprocal -- just as meanings are always shaped by scarcity and power, so 
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scarcity is always shaped by power and meaning, and power is always shaped by 
meaning and scarcity. 
Conclusion: Toward a New Rhetoric? 
What do these reflections imply for the rhetoric of labor history? 
First, they imply that we should abandon not only the base and superstructure 
model that has been under attack ever since E. P. Thompson published U 
Makin4 of the Enulish Workinu Class (19631, but the more fundamental / 
rhetorical assumption that production and exchange can legitimately be 
characterized as "material" -- a notion still espoused in practice by most 
professed Thompsonians. Instead, I think we must accept in their most 
radical form the implicit messages of the oxymoronic titles and the 
imperialist theoretical claims that are proliferating in the contemporary 
human sciences. We need, in other words, to hypothesize a world in which work 
is simultaneously "ideal" and "material" and in which everything workers do 
must be understood as simultaneously structured by discourse, by choice under 
conditions of scarcity, and by power relations. So whenever we find ourselves 
arguing that something workers do follows an economic logic, we must ask 
ourselves "How is that economic logic shaped by power and discourse?" If we 
find ourselves arguing that workers actions can be explained by power 
relations, we must ask "How are those power relations constituted by scarcity 
and discourse?" And if we find ourselves arguing that workers' actions are a 
consequence of discursive constraints, we must ask "How do these discursive 
constraints result from the operations of power and scarcity." 
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